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 Posner Tackles the Pro Se Prisoner Problem: 
A Book Review of Reforming the Federal 
Judiciary 
Katherine A. Macfarlane* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The underlying problem is the downright indifference of most 
judges to the needs of pro se’s.1 
 
After Judge Richard Posner announced he was retiring from the Seventh 
Circuit effective September 2, 2017, effusive praise poured in.  Posner was 
described as a leading public intellectual2 and “[o]ne of the nation’s most 
influential judges and legal writers.”3  The reception to Posner’s sixty-sixth 
book, Reforming the Federal Judiciary: My Former Court Needs to Overhaul 
Its Staff Attorney Program and Begin Televising Its Oral Arguments, has 
been less flattering.  Posner’s decision to include Seventh Circuit memoran-
da, draft opinions, and internal emails has raised ethical concerns.4  The dis-
cussion surrounding Posner’s self-published book has centered on its descrip-
 
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Idaho College of Law; B.A., Northwestern 
University; J.D., Loyola Law School, Los Angeles.  I am grateful to Max Williams 
for his research assistance and to the Missouri Law Review editors for their contribu-
tions.  I was invited to comment upon a manuscript version of Reforming the Federal 
Judiciary in July 2017.  In early September 2017, the book was withdrawn.  I never 
ultimately opined as to whether the book should be published and do not do so herein.  
Around October 2017, I was invited to join a group of lawyers and professors organ-
izing to advocate on behalf of pro se litigants as “Team Posner.”  I initially joined the 
group but later resigned my membership due to concerns related to malpractice cov-
erage.  I did not appear in any matter on behalf of Team Posner. 
 1. RICHARD A. POSNER, REFORMING THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: MY FORMER 
COURT NEEDS TO OVERHAUL ITS STAFF ATTORNEY PROGRAM AND BEGIN TELEVISING 
ITS ORAL ARGUMENTS 31 (2017). 
 2. Lorelei Laird, Judge Richard Posner Retires from the 7th Circuit After 36 
Years, ABA J. (Sept. 1, 2017, 5:22 PM), 
http://www.abajournal.com/news/article/judge_richard_posner_retires_from_the_7th_
circuit_after_36_years. 
 3. David Schaper, Federal Judge Richard Posner, a Leading Legal Voice, Re-
tiring from Bench, NPR (Sept. 1, 2017, 9:10 PM), 
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/09/01/548027406/federal-judge-
richard-posner-retiring-from-the-bench. 
 4. Debra Cassens Weiss, Is Posner’s ‘Baffling’ Book an Ethics Breach? Chief 
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tions of disputes with former colleagues, Posner’s decision to publish internal 
court documents, and his frustration that the Seventh Circuit rejected his offer 
to “re-write all his circuit’s staff attorneys’ memos and draft opinions before 
they went to his fellow judges.”5 
Unfortunately, the book’s tone and ethical red flags are drowning out its 
potential for true reform.  As Matthew Stiegler noted in a widely-shared blog 
post: 
Blazing a spotlight on the separate-but-equal appellate review that pro 
[se] litigants receive is vitally important.  Hardly anyone understands 
how pro se appeals are handled by the federal courts – that is, 
how differently than appeals by litigants wealthy enough to hire law-
yers.  And hardly anyone cares.  Posner is on to something big here.6 
Posner worked to draw attention to the pro se aspects of his newest pro-
ject.  He gave several interviews after his retirement in which he previewed 
the subject of Reforming the Federal Judiciary and emphasized his interest in 
the pro se.  In one interview, he declared himself newly committed to the 
“plight of litigants who represent[] themselves in civil cases,” those with real 
grievances whom the legal system nevertheless treats “impatiently, dismiss-
ing their cases over technical matters.”7  “I didn’t think the pro se litigants 
were getting a fair break,” he explained.8  In an email to the Chicago Daily 
Law Bulletin, he went further, commenting that “how the court treats pro se 
litigants” accelerated his retirement.9 
Reforming the Federal Judiciary calls for transforming the Seventh Cir-
cuit’s staff attorney program as a result of its author’s concern for the down-
trodden litigants whose fate the staff attorneys decide.  Staff attorneys and the 
courts are not doing enough for the pro se, Posner concludes, because deci-
sions in pro se cases are incomprehensible to pro se litigants.10  Moreover, 
because judges have little interest in pro se cases, most staff attorney opinion 
 
 5. Matthew Stiegler, Posner’s New Book Is Bananas, but You Might Want It 
Anyway, CA3BLOG (Sept. 18, 2017), http://ca3blog.com/judges/posners-new-book-is-
bananas-but-you-might-want-it-anyway/. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Adam Liptak, An Exit Interview with Richard Posner, Judicial Provocateur, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/11/us/politics/judge-
richard-posner-retirement.html?mcubz=1. 
 8. David Lat, Judge Posner, Uncensored: ‘I Don’t Really Care What People 
Think’, ABOVE L. (Sept. 14, 2017, 7:41 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/judge-
posner-uncensored-i-dont-really-care-what-people-think/. 
 9. Patricia Manson, Posner Says Friction on 7th Circuit Bench Led to His Re-
tirement, CHI. DAILY L. BULL. (Sept. 6, 2017, 2:22 PM), 
http://www.chicagolawbulletin.com/Articles/2017/09/06/Posner-bench-friction-9-6-
17. 
 10. POSNER, supra note 1, at 135. 
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drafts are rubber stamped by judges and receive little judicial scrutiny.11  
Posner recommends that each staff attorney-authored opinion be written for 
an audience of limited intelligence.12  Before resigning, he volunteered to 
review and edit staff attorney opinion drafts to make them more accessible to 
an uneducated pro se reader.13  His proposals regarding the Seventh Circuit’s 
staff attorney program were rejected.  This led to his resignation.14 
The Preface to Reforming the Federal Judiciary describes Posner’s Au-
gust 16, 2017, decision to publish his latest book through Amazon’s Cre-
ateSpace, as opposed to a university press.15  He announced his retirement on 
September 1, 2017.  The book’s preface is dated September 5, 2017,16 and the 
book was available on Amazon as of September 7, 2017.17  Though it was 
published after his resignation, it appears that it was completed while he was 
still a Seventh Circuit judge. 
This book review is focused on what Posner deemed the book’s “most 
important theme” – “the need for better treatment by the federal courts of pro 
se litigants.”18  His staff attorney proposals offer the most reform potential.19 
 
 11. Id. at 138. 
 12. Id. at 139. 
 13. Id. at 145. 
 14. Id. at 149. 
 15. Id. at xv. 
 16. Id. at xiv. 
 17. Reforming the Federal Judiciary, AMAZON, 
https://www.amazon.com/Reforming-Federal-Judiciary-Televising-
Arguments/dp/1976014794/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1519696291&sr=8-
1&keywords=reforming+the+federal+judiciary (last visited Mar. 23, 2018) (identify-
ing the book as a September 7, 2017 paperback). 
 18. POSNER, supra note 1, at 270. 
 19. Beyond the scope of this book review are the book’s ethical implications.  
Also unaddressed is Posner’s proposal about televising oral arguments, which takes 
up only a sliver of the book’s pages and, unlike his other proposals, is free of contro-
versy, having already garnered significant support in the Seventh Circuit.  David Lat, 
The Seventh Circuit Responds to Judge Richard Posner, ABOVE L. (Sept. 15, 2017, 
2:28 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2017/09/the-seventh-circuit-responds-to-judge-
richard-posner/ (In a statement sent to David Lat, Chief Judge Wood noted that “as 
for televising oral arguments, there is actually not as much disagreement with Dick’s 
views as one might think” and the Seventh Circuit is “moving forward with a plan for 
televising, and I expect to see it in place before too much longer.”).  A former Sev-
enth Circuit staff attorney has already eloquently criticized Posner’s writing criti-
cisms.  See Zoran Tasić, Reforming Richard Posner: The Former Federal Judge 
Needs to Overhaul His Assessment of the Seventh Circuit’s Staff Attorney Program 
and Correct the Errors in His Book 12 (2017) (unpublished manuscript) (available at 
https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B_yKMHMEBvcDMTNXOHR6dzJlQ1U/view) 
(describing the writing criticism as “perhaps the most confused and misleading part of 
the book because Posner discusses these documents as though they were written by 
staff attorneys for pro se litigants.  But only three of the 12 documents that Posner 
scrutinizes fall into that category”).  See also id. at 15–16 (“Staff attorneys walk a fine 
line.  More often than not, one of the judges on a three-judge panel will want a Spar-
3
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Following this introduction, Part II summarizes Posner’s description of 
the problems vexing pro se litigants.  Though the book’s title suggests that 
Posner prescribes system-wide judicial reform, Posner most thoroughly stud-
ied the Seventh Circuit’s practices.20  Posner did not directly study the impact 
of staff attorney work in district courts.21 
Part III examines the assumptions underlying Posner’s desire to assist 
pro se litigants, including the conclusions that pro se litigants are: “very often 
poorly educated and/or of limited intelligence”;22 “ignorant of the subtleties 
of the law”;23 and “basically fairly normal people who because of bad luck, 
psychological problems, poor judgment, lack of family support, or other in-
ternal or environmental misfortunes, simply have great difficulty living a law-
abiding life.”24  It will consider whether staff attorneys should, as Posner 
suggests, apply a test determining whether their orders are readable by pro se 
litigants by assessing the litigants’ “educational level.”25  In examining Pos-
ner’s newfound empathy for the pro se, this review will argue that empathy is 
not always a proxy for meaningful institutional change. 
Part IV concludes that though Posner has identified unjustifiable struc-
tural inequality, his recommendations would not necessarily fix it.  If pro se 
litigants deserve equal treatment, eliminating all staff attorney programs is a 
necessary step toward promoting procedural equality.26  Assign pro se cases 
directly to judges’ chambers, make staff attorneys law clerks, and allow the 
new law clerks to work directly with jurists like Richard Posner. 
II.  THE PRO SE PROBLEM, ACCORDING TO POSNER 
Though never expressly described as a book about pro se prisoners, 
prisoner cases are those Posner is most concerned with.27  His book came 
 
tan recommendation, while another will want the staff attorney to address every sin-
gle one of a pro se litigant’s 26 contentions, even if all of them are frivolous or inco-
herent.  Moreover, staff attorneys must make recommendations based on precedent.”). 
 20. The book’s subtitle, “My Former Court Needs to Overhaul Its Staff Attorney 
Program and Begin Televising Its Oral Arguments,” better describes its target. 
 21. Others have described how district courts assign pro se prisoner cases.  See, 
e.g., Lois Bloom & Helen Hershkoff, Federal Courts, Magistrate Judges, and the Pro 
Se Plaintiff, 16 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 475 (2002). 
 22. POSNER, supra note 1, at 65. 
 23. Id. at 135. 
 24. Id. at 69–70. 
 25. Id. at 70–71, 86. 
 26. I proposed similar reform at the district court level.  See Katherine A. 
Macfarlane, Shadow Judges: Staff Attorney Adjudication of Prisoner Claims, 95 OR. 
L. REV. 97 (2016). 
 27. It is initially unclear which pro se prisoners Posner is writing about: those 
who collaterally attack state or federal convictions, those who bring conditions of 
confinement claims involving state or federal prisons, or federal criminal defendants.  
Based on his reliance on statistics created by the federal courts regarding pro se appel-
4
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about, he explains, because his attitude about pro se prisoners has evolved.28  
He believes that pro se prisoners deserve his empathy and describes them, 
using Dickensian terms, as “the downtrodden” and “these unfortunates.”29  
As he notes, half of the appellants in the Seventh Circuit are pro se,30 and half 
of that group are incarcerated.31  Posner is concerned that “most of the liti-
gants who interact with staff attorneys” are unrepresented and “have the fur-
ther handicap of being prison inmates.”32  He focuses on reforming staff at-
torney programs because “staff attorneys . . . handle most pro se cases,”33 and 
“staff attorneys’ interaction with pro se litigants” is the aspect of staff attor-
ney work that interests him the most.34  That is, if staff attorney programs are 
reformed, then pro se prisoners will receive more justice. 
Posner’s emphasis is on the Seventh Circuit’s staff attorney program, 
which he compares to programs in other circuits.35  To explain why he targets 
staff attorney programs for reform, Posner spends several chapters introduc-
ing the unfamiliar reader to staff attorneys by describing the staff attorney 
 
lants, it is likely that his concerns are limited to cases involving habeas petitions and 
conditions of confinement claims.  See POSNER, supra note 1, at 13 (citing TABLE 2.4 
– U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS – PRO SE CASES FILED (Sept. 30, 2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/Table2.04.pdf, for the proposi-
tion that “[i]n 2015 . . . 46 percent of the pro se’s were prisoners”).  The table in ques-
tion lists the number of pro se appeals filed in the U.S. Courts of Appeals (excluding 
the Federal Circuit) for the twelve-month period ending on September 30, 2015 (not 
the year 2015) and breaks the cases into eight categories, including private prisoner 
petitions, U.S. prisoner petitions, and criminal appeals.  TABLE 2.4 – U.S. COURTS OF 
APPEALS – PRO SE CASES FILED, supra.  The table identifies 26,883 total pro se ap-
peals, and 12,406 prisoner petitions, or forty-six percent of the total.  Id. 
 28. POSNER, supra note 1, at ix. 
 29. Id. at viii–ix. 
 30. Id. at 6.  In the twelve-month period ending September 30, 2015, of the 2926 
appeals brought in the Seventh Circuit, 1673 were pro se at the time of filing.  TABLE 
B-9: U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS – PRO SE CASES COMMENCED AND TERMINATED, BY 
CIRCUIT AND NATURE OF PROCEEDING, DURING THE 12-MONTH PERIOD ENDING 
SEPTEMBER 30, 2015 at 3 (2015), 
http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/B09Sep15.pdf [hereinafter 
TABLE B-9]. 
 31. POSNER, supra note 1, at 270.  In the twelve-month period ending September 
30, 2015, of the 1673 appeals brought in the Seventh Circuit that were pro se at the 
time of filing, 163 were criminal cases, 297 were habeas petitions or prison condition 
cases brought by federal inmates, and 583 were habeas petitions or prison condition 
cases brought by state inmates.  TABLE B-9, supra note 30, at 3.  In 2016, across all 
circuits, “[a]ppeals involving pro se litigants . . . rose 18 percent.”  Judicial Business 
2016, U.S. CTS., http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/judicial-business-2016 
(last visited Mar. 23, 2018). 
 32. POSNER, supra note 1, at viii–ix. 
 33. Id. at 14. 
 34. Id. at 33. 
 35. Id. at 1.  The other circuits’ staff attorney programs are described in Chapter 
3.  See id. at 49–61. 
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program in the Seventh Circuit.  There, staff attorneys are judicial advisors 
who inform judges “about the court’s cases that are not orally argued, often 
because the appellant has no lawyer.”36  Unlike law clerks, who are hired by 
judges themselves, staff attorneys are hired by a senior staff attorney who 
directs the court’s staff attorney program.37  The senior staff attorney reports 
to the court’s chief judge.38  In the Seventh Circuit, staff attorney positions 
typically last two years, though supervisory staff attorneys have indefinite 
terms.39  Staff attorneys are not assigned to an individual judge but work for 
the court.40 
Posner estimates that there are 401 staff attorneys in the federal appel-
late judiciary.41  There are “24 or 25” staff attorneys in the Seventh Circuit, 
compared to 11 judges and 43 law clerks.42  The cases staff attorneys work 
on, Posner tells the reader, “are on average less important than those handled 
by law clerks for their judges.”43  Still, as compared to law clerks, staff attor-
neys “have more juridical influence” because judges tend to “rubber stamp” 
staff attorney recommendations.44  Posner describes the staff attorney case-
load as “heavy” and that unlike law clerks, staff attorneys have infrequent 
contact with judges.45  Appeals brought by pro se litigants are referred “in the 
first instance” to staff attorneys, who draft orders and recommendation mem-
oranda regarding how the cases should be decided.46 
According to Posner, many judges “regard pro se litigants as losers and 
pests, and as a result often in effect delegate the decision of pro se cases to 
staff attorneys.”47  Though Posner does not ascribe to similar pejoratives, he 
does describe all staff attorney cases, including those involving pro se liti-
gants, as less important.  He never suggests that they be handled in chambers 
by law clerks.48 
Rather, throughout his book, Posner emphasizes the need to improve the 
quality of written decisions in pro se cases.  He wants staff attorneys to draft 
decisions so that they are “complete, sufficient, and intelligible to the pro se 
litigants.”49  He accepts that “most” “but not all” pro se appeals are “doomed 
 
 36. Id. at 3. 
 37. Id. at 4–5. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. at 5. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 6. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 14. 
 46. Id. at 6. 
 47. Id. at 270. 
 48. See id. at 7 (describing pro se litigation at the trial level as “plac[ing] a great 
strain on judge and jury – indeed, the pro se’s untutored self-advocacy may border on, 
or even cross over into, unintelligibility”). 
 49. Id. at 21. 
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to fail”50 but does not wish to change how pro se cases are decided.  Instead, 
he wants pro se litigants to be treated with empathy and decency. 
To achieve these goals, orders and opinions in pro se cases must be in-
telligible to the pro se.  He wants to treat pro se litigants decently because 
they have “intellectual and educational deficiencies” which, along with being 
unrepresented, give them a litigation disadvantage.51  Posner is also sympa-
thetic because “American prison sentences tend to be far too long.”52  Posner 
notes that state prisons “often fail to provide inmates with proper protection 
and adequate medical care.”53  Here, he comes close to suggesting that the 
law controlling prison conditions may be unnecessarily anti-prisoner, but 
stops short of this conclusion.  Instead, safety and healthcare problems are 
just additional reasons to treat pro se litigants with decency, a goal accom-
plished through writing intelligible orders.54 
In introducing the reader to staff attorneys, Posner describes their re-
sponsibilities.  The Seventh Circuit’s staff attorneys work on either habeas 
corpus filings, motions, or a merits unit, which “prepares bench memos for 
judges assigned to ‘short-argument days’ . . . and also for judges participating 
in ‘Rule 34’ conferences.”55  During these conferences, judges and staff at-
torneys discuss cases deemed unsuitable for oral argument.56  Prior to a Rule 
34 conference, staff attorneys draft a proposed order regarding each Rule 34 
case.57  At the Rule 34 conference, judges suggest revisions to the staff attor-
neys’ draft orders, which are then “revised and issued.”58 
Posner is concerned that the orders issued after Rule 34 conferences do 
not adequately explain why oral argument was unnecessary.59  He criticizes 
the phrasing inserted into post-Rule 34 conference orders that explains why 
oral argument was denied.60  He suggests that “[a] good reason [to forego oral 
argument] in many cases would be that the appellant or appellee was pro se” 
and that orders should state as much.61  Posner never explains why a party’s 
pro se status is a good reason to deny oral argument. 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 22. 
 54. Though Posner devotes a significant number of pages to the outcome in one 
pro se deliberate indifference case involving a serious medical condition, which he 
describes as “heartless,” id. at 26, he attributes the outcome not to staff attorneys but 
to judges.  Id. at 27.  This begs the question of why this particular case was included 
in a book that intends to reform staff attorney practices. 
 55. Id. at 36. 
 56. Id. at 11. 
 57. Id. at 9. 
 58. Id. 
 59. See id. at 11. 
 60. Id. at 11–12. 
 61. Id. at 11. 
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Posner describes Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 34 as encouraging 
oral argument “if but only if it is likely to contribute to a sound result.”62  
That is, he characterizes oral argument as the exception, available only if it 
will help judges reach a good outcome.  The rule in fact provides that oral 
argument “must be allowed in every case,” unless: 
 
[A] panel of three judges who have examined the briefs and rec-
ord unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary for any 
of the following reasons: 
(A) the appeal is frivolous;  
(B) the dispositive issue or issues have been authoritatively de-
cided; or 
   (C) the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented in the 
briefs and record, and the decisional process would not be significant-
ly aided by oral argument.63 
If one does not want to sit through a pro se oral argument, perhaps the 
presence of a pro se litigant is reason to conclude that “the decisional process 
would not be significantly aided by oral argument.”64  Rules that eliminate 
oral argument, however, limit the opportunity for advocacy.65  Concluding 
that any case involving a pro se litigant is per se unsuitable for oral argument 
is the kind of assumption Posner initially seemed to reject.  Yet, he endorses 
differential treatment for purposes of oral argument. 
Oral argument might be helpful to a pro se who can communicate argu-
ments orally but cannot write well.66  Yet, as Professor John Oakley has ex-
plained, when appellate cases are tracked to staff attorneys and identified by 
the staff attorneys as “appropriate for procedural short-cuts,” almost uniform-
ly, one of the shortcuts is foregoing oral argument.67  Local rules across cir-
 
 62. Id. at 9. 
 63. FED. R. APP. P. 34(a)(2) (emphasis added). 
 64. See John B. Oakley, The Screening of Appeals: The Ninth Circuit’s Experi-
ence in the Eighties and Innovations for the Nineties, 1991 BYU L. REV. 859, 902 
(1991).  See also id. at 861 (asserting that staff attorneys replace judges “in the adju-
dication of screened cases” to “achieve procedural economies with no significant 
impact on substantive results”). 
 65. See Penelope Pether, Inequitable Injunctions: The Scandal of Private Judg-
ing in the U.S. Courts, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1435, 1464 (2004) (describing the lack of 
oral argument in pro se cases as an example of “normalizing structural subordina-
tion”). 
 66. See CPC International, Inc., v. Archer Daniels Midland Company: Appeal 
Nos. 94-1045, -1060: Brief for Amicus Curiae, in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Federal Circuit, 4 FED. CIRCUIT B.J. 269, 284 (1994). 
 67. Oakley, supra note 64, at 860. 
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cuits illustrate the courts’ commitment to avoiding oral argument in pro se 
cases.68  Chief Judge Diane Wood has referred to the Seventh Circuit’s “Rule 
34 docket,” which includes cases in which oral argument is deemed unneces-
sary, as a docket involving “cases in which at least one party is pro se and 
thus that the court designates for decision without oral argument.”69 
Posner does not advocate for a radical overhaul of the staff attorney 
program nor does he suggest that pro se litigants be given more oral argu-
ments.  Rather, his recommendations are aimed at judges and pertain to staff 
attorney order and opinion drafts.  First, he recommends that if a pro se ap-
peal is denied, the denial be accompanied by “brief statements of the rea-
son(s)” for the denial.70  Without a “lucid statement” of the reasons for the 
denial, a pro se may be left feeling “disillusioned about the federal courts and 
with no clue as to how he might continue and improve his efforts to alleviate 
his situation.”71  Posner volunteered to add “lucid explanation[s]” to every 
pro se order entered by his court.72 
Second, he urges judges to “[p]articipate in periodic writing workshops 
with staff attorneys.”73  Chapter 6, “Improving Output,” is devoted to illus-
trating perceived writing deficiencies and suggesting improvements that will 
make the final product that reaches pro se litigants “accessible, meaningful 
and intelligible” to its audience.74 
Third, judges should communicate with staff attorneys before they meet 
with them to discuss draft orders or opinions.75  Fourth, if a judge edits a staff 
attorney draft, the staff attorney should be informed as to what changes the 
judge made.76  Fifth, judges should speak with staff attorneys in advance of 
any short argument days involving the staff attorney’s work to exchange ide-
 
 68. See Michael Correll, Finding the Limits of Equitable Liberality: Reconsider-
ing the Liberal Construction of Pro Se Appellate Briefs, 35 VT. L. REV. 863, 878 
(2011).  See also id. at 882 n.94 (“Similarly, the Second Circuit also has developed a 
number of local rules governing all pro se cases regardless of the sophistication of a 
given litigant. . . . Local Rule 27(j) erects additional barriers to entry by requiring a 
precise statement of issues for appeal as an initial filing requirement, and Local 
Rule 34 reduces pro se oral arguments to just five minutes – well less than the stand-
ard ten to fifteen minutes afforded to represented parties.”); Karen J. Wil-
liams, Foreword, 60 S.C. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2009) (“All pro se appeals filed in the 
Fourth Circuit are scheduled for informal briefing and are decided on the briefs unless 
a panel member believes that the case warrants formal briefing and oral argument.”). 
 69. Diane P. Wood, Snapshots from the Seventh Circuit: Continuity and Change, 
1966–2007, 2008 WIS. L. REV. 1, 22–23 (2008). 
 70. POSNER, supra note 1, at 29. 
 71. Id. at 41. 
 72. Id. at 41–42. 
 73. Id. at 30.  According to Posner, staff attorney memos are far too verbose.  Id. 
at 38. 
 74. See id. at 87–134. 
 75. Id. at 30. 
 76. Id. 
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as.77  Sixth, judges should recruit more pro bono counsel for pro se appel-
lants.78  Seventh, a staff attorney recommendation “should not be rubber 
stamped by the judges.”79  Here, Posner notes that “[t]he underlying problem 
is the downright indifference of most judges to the needs of pro se’s.”80  They 
rubber stamp staff attorney recommendations because they are “distracted, 
preoccupied, or uninterested in pro se cases.”81 
Finally, Posner recommends that there should be no difference between 
decisions labeled orders and those labeled opinions.82  Generally, only opin-
ions are published, and therefore, they are written with greater care.  Both 
orders and opinions should be published, he contends.  If orders, the label 
typically affixed to decisions in pro se cases, were indistinguishable from 
opinions, then their overall quality might improve.  Pro se litigants deserve 
this additional attention to the writing that decides their cases.83 
Posner’s decision to focus on staff attorneys and the treatment of pro se 
litigants is one that leads him to describe himself, with respect to his latest 
book, as “a fighter.”84  He self-published his book and plans to distribute free 
copies to federal judges and staff attorneys.  In October 2017, Posner an-
nounced plans to form a pro bono group comprised of “lawyers and consult-
ants” to assist pro se litigants.85  On December 21, 2017, Posner appeared as 
 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id.  Posner suggests that “[t]here are law firms, in Chicago particularly, that 
encourage their junior lawyers . . . to represent pro se’s at no cost to the pro se’s.”  Id. 
It may be true that large law firms encourage associates to engage in pro bono work.  
However, many law firms implicitly cap the number of pro bono hours associates are 
entitled to accumulate by only counting a set number of pro bono hours towards asso-
ciates’ yearly billable hour total.  They may penalize associates for working too many 
hours on a pro bono case.  After all, law firms are for-profit entities, and discouraging 
pro bono work is good for business.  In my own days as a Big Law associate, I as-
sumed pro bono representation of a formerly pro se prisoner in a conditions of con-
finement case in the Central District of California.  It was a thrilling experience that 
made me a much better lawyer.  Still, during the performance review that encom-
passed the time I spent on my prisoner case, I was criticized for the 600 hours I de-
voted to it, even though I had also met the firm’s 2100 hour yearly minimum and 
received positive reviews about the quality of my billable work.  My representation 
was lauded by the federal judge who presided over the prisoner case and brought 
positive attention to my firm.  Still, in my own workplace, it was not perceived as an 
endeavor that advanced my career. 
 79. Id. at 31. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. at 32. 
 84. Id. at 2. 
 85. Debra Cassens Weiss, Posner Says He Is Organizing a National Pro-Bono 
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counsel of record for William Bond, a formerly pro se Fourth Circuit appel-
lant.86 
Many of Posner’s recommendations are stylistic and propose that deci-
sions involving pro se parties should be easier for a pro se to read and com-
prehend.  There are also recommendations to increase pro bono representa-
tion and the number of meetings between staff attorneys and judges.  Howev-
er, Posner does not recommend treating pro se cases like all other matters, in 
which law clerks draft bench memoranda for a three-judge panel that will 
always include the judge the law clerks work for.  Moreover, he does not seek 
to alter the outcomes in pro se cases (though the suggestion that the court 
attempt to recruit more pro bono counsel comes close). 
III.  ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING POSNER’S PERCEPTION OF THE PRO 
SE PROBLEM 
Reforming the Federal Judiciary recommends reforming staff attorney 
programs to better serve pro se litigants based on two important assumptions: 
first, pro se prisoners share traits that render them worthy of empathy, and 
second, if staff attorneys write decisions that are intelligible to pro se liti-
gants, the worst problem vexing staff attorney programs will be solved.  But 
if these assumptions are incorrect, then perhaps Posner’s proposed solutions 
are imperfect.  This part examines the generalizations that motivated Posner’s 
reform proposals. 
A.  Common Pro Se Prisoner Traits 
Pro se litigants, according to Posner, are poorly educated, of limited in-
telligence, ignorant of the law, and “basically fairly normal people who be-
cause of bad luck, psychological problems, poor judgment, lack of family 
support, or other internal or environmental misfortunes, simply have great 
difficulty living a law-abiding life.”87  Therefore, they deserve empathy and 
better treatment.88  If only the judiciary had more empathy and put in “modest 
effort,”89 his simple goal (better treatment of the pro se through improved 
writing in pro se cases) could be achieved. 
Studies support Posner’s assumption that the incarcerated are less edu-
cated than the general public.90  If most prisoners are less educated than the 
 
 86.  Appearance of Counsel, Bond v. United States, No. 17-2150 (4th Cir. Dec. 
21, 2017).  Prior to entering an appearance, Posner had attempted to participate in 
Bond’s case as advisory counsel.  Letter by Appellant William C. Bond, Bond v. 
United States, No. 17-2150 (4th Cir. Nov. 30, 2017). 
 87. POSNER, supra note 1, at 69–70. 
 88. Id. at 270–71. 
 89. Id. at 271. 
 90. See, e.g., CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, EDUCATION AND CORRECTIONAL 
POPULATIONS  2 (Apr. 15, 2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ecp.pdf (stating 
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general public, then perhaps most pro se prisoner litigants are too.  But Pos-
ner’s oft-repeated assumption that pro se prisoner litigants are of limited in-
telligence is more difficult to support.91  Indeed, a pro se’s ability to file a 
circuit court appeal despite his or her limited education, while incarcerated, 
and without the benefit of counsel’s advice, suggests that prisoners who liti-
gate pro se are quite intelligent. 
Also questionable is the significance of Posner’s assertion that the in-
carcerated are “basically fairly normal people.”92  No explanation is provided 
as to what “basically fairly normal” means or how “basically fairly normal” is 
measured.  This particular generalization is based on Posner’s recent visit to 
Cook County Jail and a previous visit to a federal prison.93  That is, he argues 
for better treatment of pro se litigants based on what he gleaned from visits to 
one jail and one prison where he interacted with a small number of detainees 
and inmates.94  In Cook County, he spoke to five inmates and found them to 
be “pleasant, articulate, unthreatening, and . . . quite normal.”95  One was 
clearly “very intelligent.”96  He might have met “basically fairly normal” 
inmates who were abnormal litigants.  It appears he never asked the inmates 
if they had any litigation experience.  The reader will never know. 
Even if Posner’s assumptions about pro se litigant traits are correct, they 
are of questionable value.  Pro se pleadings are liberally construed, and, in 
theory, we do not execute those who are severely intellectually disabled.97  
But the courts do not make additional procedural concessions for the unedu-
cated or the unintelligent.  If we choose lack of education or limited intelli-
gence as factors that determine how parties should be treated, we might also 
wish to consider other characteristics that create systematic oppression, such 
as race, gender, and class.  Others may believe that different kinds of experi-
ences merit empathy, such as a recent divorce or illness.  What one judge 
perceives to be a privileged trait might, to a different judge, be perceived as 
oppressive.  Even if the generalizations about the pro se ring true, urging that 
different procedures apply to parties who one judge thinks are deserving of 
empathy is a slippery slope.  Posner’s standards may at first control who is 
 
that “[c]orrectional populations report lower educational attainment than do those in 
the general population” and are less likely to graduate high school or take college-
level courses). 
 91. Posner at times replaces his conclusion that pro se litigants are unintelligent 
with the conclusion that pro se litigants have low IQs.  See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 
1, at 270. 
 92. Id. at 69. 
 93. Id. at 68 (noting that “about 300” of the jail’s detainees file suits in federal 
district court each year and that “[t]hey are among the pro se’s who are likely to ap-
peal to my court if they lose in the district court”). 
 94. Id. at 68–70. 
 95. Id. at 68. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321 (2002) (holding that the execution 
of mentally retarded criminals is excessive and unconstitutional). 
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worthy of empathy, but once subjective criteria begin to impact procedure, 
less deserving parties who other judges empathize with may also begin to 
receive procedural privileges. 
B.  Well-Written Decisions Containing Legal Advice Will Help the   
Pro Se 
Posner pinpoints the failure to explain why a decision in a pro se case is 
granted or denied as “the most serious problem with the current [staff attor-
ney] program.”98  He proposes giving pro se litigants access to the memo or 
draft order staff attorneys prepare for the judges who decide their fate.99 
For this procedure to be effective, Posner contends that the memo or 
draft order must be intelligible to the pro se.100  This can be achieved by writ-
ing in a manner that takes into account the pro se’s ability to understand a 
text.  The pro se’s court submissions should be subject to “the Flesch-Kinkaid 
Reading Test, which is a simple algorithm . . . for determining the educational 
level necessary to understand a given text.”101  In addition, the material pro-
vided to pro se litigants should detail any available possible alternative reme-
dy “to give [the pro se] . . . a fighting chance of future success.”102 
Posner grants that his proposal is unpopular with other judges who be-
lieve that assisting any litigant “discriminate[s] impermissibly against that 
litigant’s adversary.”103  As a jurist, Posner resisted assisting one party over 
another, proclaiming that “[o]ur system of justice is adversarial, and our 
judges are busy people . . . they are not going to do the plaintiff’s research 
and try to discover whether there might be something to say against the de-
fendants’ reasoning.”104  Though Posner has acknowledged that pro se liti-
gants should be advised by a judge “concerning some of the obscurer pitfalls 
of legal procedure,”105 in one opinion, he emphasized that 
[o]urs is an adversarial system; the judge looks to the parties to frame 
the issues for trial and judgment.  Our busy district judges do not have 
the time to play the “proactive” role of a Continental European judge.  
True, they want to do justice as well as merely umpire disputes, and 
they should not be criticized when they point out to counsel a line of 
argument or inquiry that he has overlooked, although they are not 
 
 98. POSNER, supra note 1, at 82. 
 99. Id. 
 100. Id. at 83. 
 101. Id. at 70. 
 102. Id. at 71. 
 103. Id. at 270. 
 104. Kirksey v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 168 F.3d 1039, 1041 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(Posner, J.). 
 105. Ball v. City of Chicago, 2 F.3d 752, 756 (7th Cir. 1993) (Posner, J.). 
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obliged to do so and (with immaterial exceptions) they may not do so 
when an issue has been raised.106 
Setting aside what happens when a judge advises one litigant at anoth-
er’s expense, it is unclear that the failure to provide an explanation alongside 
a decision is a problem in search of a solution.  The most common decision in 
an appellate pro se case is “a decision affirming dismissal of his suit by a 
district court.”107  Why would a pro se benefit from knowing why he or she 
lost, if the outcome remains unchanged?  This recommendation aligns with 
Posner’s belief that all parties should know why they won or lost.  But no-
where does Posner explain why a pro se litigant’s life will be altered by 
knowing why he or she failed. 
What of Posner’s suggestion that providing an explanation as to why a 
pro se lost will help “give him a fighting chance of future success”?108  Future 
success is a lofty goal for pro se prisoners who return to court.  For example, 
a court may not grant in forma pauperis status to a prisoner who seeks to file 
a non-habeas civil action and “‘has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while in-
carcerated . . ., brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that 
was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a 
claim upon which relief may be granted.’”109  The “three strikes” rule is sig-
nificant: “approximately ninety-five percent of prisoner-initiated suits are 
filed IFP.”110  If one of the appeals the Seventh Circuit denies relates to a case 
that constitutes a prisoner’s third strike, the prisoner cannot file another case 
in forma pauperis and, therefore, will likely be unable to refile at all. 
Second or successive habeas petitions are also subject to strict limits: 
A district court cannot hear a second or successive habeas petition un-
less the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals authorizes the court to con-
sider the application.  When a petitioner attempts to present claims 
that he could have raised in a prior petition, the court must dismiss 
them as successive, unless the claim fits one of two exceptions.  First, 
the court may hear a successive claim if it relies upon a new rule of 
constitutional law made retroactive to review, which was previously 
unavailable.  Second, the court may hear a successive claim if the fac-
tual predicate could not have been discovered previously and, if prov-
en and considered in light of the evidence as a whole, would establish 
 
 106. Burdett v. Miller, 957 F.2d 1375, 1380 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (citations 
omitted). 
 107. POSNER, supra note 1, at 71. 
 108. See id. 
 109. Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1761 (2015) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 
1915(g) (2012)). 
 110. B. Patrick Costello, Jr., “Imminent Danger” Within 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) of 
the Prison Litigation Reform Act: Are Congress and Courts Being Realistic?, 29 J. 
LEGIS. 1, 1 (2002). 
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that no reasonable factfinder would have found the petitioner guilty of 
the offense.111 
To the extent “stated reasons” would encourage direct appeals, this too is a 
recommendation without significant reform potential.  A pro se petition for 
certiorari has next to no chance of being granted.112 
Posner accepts that most pro se appeals will be denied.  But it is unclear 
why sharing the reasons for denial will give a pro se litigant a second chance 
at anything. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
A book arguing that pro se litigants deserve better treatment warrants 
our attention.  So does a book that dares to examine the work undertaken by 
staff attorneys, who Posner reveals draft orders and opinions that are rubber 
stamped by judges. 
Swift disposal of pro se litigation is often deemed necessary to keep the 
federal courts running.113  Because pro se prisoner litigation is considered 
uninteresting and burdensome, it is assigned to staff attorneys as opposed to 
judges’ law clerks.  Revealing these truths is an important first step toward 
acknowledging that not all cases are treated equally by our federal courts. 
Yet the proposed solutions to the treatment an entire class of disadvan-
taged litigants receives do not do enough to change a broken system.  Posner 
wants staff attorneys to improve their writing and believes that decisions in 
pro se cases should explain why appeals were denied (the most common out-
come).114  These are changes that may improve the overall quality of Seventh 
Circuit opinions but will not do much for pro se litigants.  It may appear that 
pro se litigants are receiving more empathy, but if their odds of obtaining 
relief never change, true reform never happens. 
Posner does come close to a real solution.  He recommends that judges 
interact more often with staff attorneys, by working with them to improve 
their writing through workshops.  He thinks that judges and staff attorneys 
should communicate before staff attorneys deliver a draft order or opinion to 
a judge.  Increased interaction might encourage judges to scrutinize staff at-
torney work more closely instead of rubber stamping it. 
One change could accomplish all of the above: eliminate staff attorney 
positions and convert them all to in-chambers law clerk positions.  The inter-
action between staff attorneys and judges Posner describes as ideal is exactly 
 
 111. Hall v. Boatwright, No. 09–CV–347, 2009 WL 3336098, at *1 (E.D. Wis. 
Oct. 15, 2009) (citations omitted). 
 112. Kevin H. Smith, Justice for All?: The Supreme Court’s Denial of Pro Se 
Petitions for Certiorari, 63 ALB. L. REV. 381, 383–84 (1999) (describing the next to 
impossible chance of a pro se petition for certiorari being granted). 
 113. See Drew A. Swank, The Pro Se Phenomenon, 19 BYU J. PUB. L. 373, 384 
(2005). 
 114. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 71, 76. 
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the kind of interaction law clerks and judges enjoy already.  Presumably, 
sitting in a judge’s chambers as a law clerk allows for more interaction be-
tween opinion drafter and judge, limiting the kind of rubber stamping Posner 
has observed in other contexts.  If pro se litigants deserve more help than the 
average party, why create a separate track for their cases?  Assign pro se cas-
es directly to judges’ chambers, where they can be handled by individuals 
with the same status as those who preside over represented parties’ claims.115 
One recent development overshadows the potential of each recommen-
dation in Reforming the Federal Judiciary.  I am thrilled by the idea of Rich-
ard Posner, a brilliant jurist, turning his attention to pro se advocacy.  It will 
be wonderful to see him represent formerly pro se prisoners.  Suitable cases 
that survive summary judgment might be referred to him by district court pro 
bono committees.  Through representation of and interaction with prisoners, 
he might discover that appellate decisions are the least of prisoner litigants’ 
worries.  As an advocate guided by his clients’ wishes, he might also effect 
more concrete reform. 
 
 
 115. Professor Judith Resnik has discussed how the status of those who decide 
certain cases affects how the cases and the litigants the cases involve are handled by 
federal courts.  See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Housekeeping: The Nature and Allocation of 
Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909 (1990). 
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